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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
This brief is filed on behalf of the undersigned
Law Professors identified in Appendix A. Amici are
scholars at U.S. law schools whose research and teaching focus is intellectual property law. Amici have no direct interest in the outcome of this litigation. Amici are
concerned that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit’s decision below – that all content-based determinations in trademark law must survive strict scrutiny – would wreak havoc on trademark law. We wish
to bring to the Court’s attention the implications of
such a rule on trademark law.1
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Federal Circuit’s ruling that the § 2(a) disparagement provision is unconstitutional, if upheld, could
allow for numerous provisions of the Trademark Act to
be overturned, dismantling the modern trademark system. The trademark system is premised on evaluating
speech and making content-based determinations.
Granting a trademark registration requires contentbased determinations, though not viewpoint-based, as
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amici affirm that no counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person
other than Amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution
to its preparation or submission. Petitioner’s and Respondent’s
consent to the filing of amicus briefs is filed with the Clerk. The
Parties were timely notified of the intent to file this amicus brief
pursuant to Rule 37.2. Amici’s institutional affiliations are provided only for purposes of identification.
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words are evaluated independent of applicants’ individual viewpoints.
In no way does the refusal to register a trademark
prevent its use or diminish public debate. Rather than
facilitating public debate, a trademark registration is
a government-issued document that makes it easier
for its owner to suppress the speech of others. A trademark registration is not an entry pass to the forum; it
is a right to exclude. Thus in trademark law whether
the government refuses registration to a mark owner
or it arms that owner with a registration to enforce
against other speakers, the government inevitably interferes in someone’s speech.
The Federal Circuit’s mistake was to treat a regulatory, benefit-granting program as if it were a ban on
speech. Although prohibiting the use of disparaging
marks would suppress speech, the government does
not suppress speech by refusing to include these marks
on the federal register. If a firm wants to use the Nword as its mark, it is free to do so under trademark
law. Instead of doctrines focused on banned speech, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a more appropriate test for the trademark registration system, and
because registration does not attempt to affect a registrant’s speech outside the four corners of the registration it poses no First Amendment problem.
The different justifications, functioning, and risks
of registration compared to laws punishing speech
make application of doctrines about banning speech to
the Lanham Act both incoherent and unwise. To rule

3
otherwise would jeopardize much of the structure of
trademark law.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISION
WRONGLY TREATS TRADEMARK REGISTRATION REFUSAL AS A BAN ON
SPEECH.

In its decision below, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that its decision put other provisions of the Lanham Act in jeopardy. Although its specific holding was
limited to the refusal of registration for disparaging
marks under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) [§ 2(a)], the en banc
court made clear that its analysis would require
reconsidering “the constitutionality of other portions
of § 2 in light of the present decision.” In re Tam, 808
F.3d 1321, 1130 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This is no idle
threat. If the Federal Circuit’s ruling stands, much of
the screening that the United States Patent and
Trademark Office [USPTO] performs could also be
found unconstitutional, and many aspects of the current regime, from incontestability2 to intent-to-use
2

The result of incontestability is that “trademarks” with no
meaning in the marketplace may be used to suppress others’ uses
of descriptive terms, despite the fact that consumers could not be
harmed by such uses. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
469 U.S. 189, 207-09 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and Free Speech, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2745016).

4
applications,3 to the infringement standard itself,
would be threatened. This widespread vulnerability
suggests that the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the
Lanham Act’s regulatory scheme as presumptively unconstitutional is misguided.
A. Trademark Law Is Pervasively ContentBased.
The Federal Circuit held that all regulations of
speech that depend on an evaluation of the content of
the speech to determine whether the regulation has
been violated are content-based and must survive
strict scrutiny. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1335 (“It is beyond dispute that § 2(a) discriminates on the basis of
content in the sense that it ‘applies to particular
speech because of the topic discussed,’ ” citing Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).). But if
strict scrutiny applies whenever a program of government benefits for specific kinds of commercial speech
demands content determinations, then much of § 2,
and possibly much more than that, is unconstitutional.
In addition to the bar on disparaging marks, § 2
prohibits the registration of any mark that is: scandalous; immoral; deceptive; falsely suggestive of a connection with persons, institutions or religions; likely to
cause confusion with an existing mark; descriptive;
3

The Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions allow claimants
to assert rights in advance of any use – that is, before consumers
form any beliefs about the source of products or services bearing
the mark, and thus before they could actually be confused by competing uses, changing the common law first-to-use rules.

5
misdescriptive; functional; a geographic indication for
wine or spirits other than the place of origin of the
goods; government insignia; a living person’s name,
portrait or signature without written consent; or a surname. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a-e). Nor, because § 2 requires
that a mark be distinctive, may generic symbols be registered. Id. at § 1052 (limiting registration to trademarks “by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others”); Park ‘N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
Most of these bars have been in place since the inception of the federal trademark registration program in
1905,4 and are routinely applied by the USPTO.
This broad list of bars to registration serves a
number of policies that go well beyond protecting consumers from deception in the marketplace. A number
of the bars deal with confusing or deceptive marks.5
Some bars, and the prohibition on registering generic
symbols, relate to another central concern of trademark law: competition.6 Significantly, however, a
number of the bars apply to marks that are neither
4
The disparagement bar was enacted in 1946, as part of the
Lanham Act’s original text. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, title
I, § 2, 60 Stat. 427.
5
Specifically, the bars for marks that are deceptive; falsely
suggestive of a connection with persons, institutions or religions;
likely to cause confusion with an existing mark; and primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive directly implicate deception.
6
The bars for marks that are descriptive, misdescriptive,
merely a surname, and functional limit the monopolization of words
and designs that competitors may desire to use in commerce.

6
confusing/deceptive nor anticompetitive on their face.
These include the disparaging, scandalous, and immoral bars, but also include the bars on inaccurate but
not necessarily misleading geographical indications of
origin for wine or spirits, names of specific living persons absent written consent, and government insignia.7 These bars relate to other policy concerns.
What the Federal Circuit observed of disparagement is
equally true of the competition-related and other nondeception-related bars:
[t]hese latter restrictions cannot be justified
on the basis that they further the Lanham
Act’s purpose in preventing consumers from
being deceived. These exclusions from registration do not rest on any judgment that the
mark is deceptive or likely to cause consumer
confusion, nor do they protect the markholder’s investment in his mark.
In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329. These bars, including the
disparagement bar, do target categories of symbols
that are less likely to serve the trademark function
than other symbols because of the additional meanings
7

Section 2(b), for instance, bars marks consisting of flags,
coats of arms, or “other insignia of the United States, or of any State
or municipality, or of any foreign nation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b). These
bans are effectuated on a per se basis. This list of banned insignia
represents institutions that Congress presumably thought should
be spared any commercial appropriation, not just instances that
would sully these symbols based on the particular use involved.
Renna v. County of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310, 320-21 (D.N.J. 2014)
(discussing the free speech interests involved in making insignia
unregistrable); Christine Haight Farley, Stabilizing Morality in
Trademark Law, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 1019, 1037-38 (2014).

7
they carry that can overwhelm or detract from potential source-signifying function. See Michael Grynberg,
A Trademark Defense of the Disparagement Bar, 126
Yale L.J. Forum 178 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/a-trademark-defense-of-the-disparagement-bar.
Nonetheless, they are not centrally about deception.
For example, the bar on registering symbols that
merely truthfully describe the applicant’s goods and
services is obviously content-based, and it is also
clearly not about deception. The descriptiveness bar,
like the others, is connected to the broader policy goals
of trademark law, but that is to say that registration,
and the registration bars, serve government interests
beyond deception.
To determine whether the mark itself, or matter
contained within the mark, corresponds to any of the
bars in § 2, the USPTO must evaluate the content of
the mark, with the exception of the bar on utilitarian
functionality.8 Thus, just as the bar at issue in this case
8

The functionality bar in § 2(e)(5) does not require the
USPTO to decipher a meaning from the applied-for design. 15
U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5). Aesthetic functionality, however, requires a
determination of the aesthetic value of a design. Thus, registration may hinge on a determination of what the design depicts, Int’l
Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919
(9th Cir. 1980) (finding that the applied-for design was the emblem of a young women’s fraternal organization), or what the
design conveys, In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., No.
77590475, 2013 WL 2951796, at *9-10 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2013)
(finding that the color black communicates particular messages
such as luxury and elegance, or grief and condolence, and that the
color of floral packaging can be just as important as the color of
the flowers themselves in conveying such messages.).

8
requires the government to evaluate the meaning of
Mr. Tam’s mark in the context of his services, so too do
these other bars. For instance, if an applicant applies
for a registration of the word mark BRAMLEY, the
USPTO must determine if that word would be understood by a substantial number of consumers as the
name of a living person, a place, or a surname. In re
Quadrillion Publ’g Ltd., No. 75/217,892, 2000 WL
1195470, at *1-2 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 9, 2000). Likewise, in
determining whether a word or words are confusing,
deceptive, descriptive or misdescriptive, the USPTO
must first parse the meaning of the word to its audience. Nor is this task limited to words. Consider § 2(b),
which requires the USPTO to determine whether an
applied for design is a “simulation” of an existing flag.
See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216
(T.T.A.B. 1993).
B. Section 2 Disparagement, Like Defamation Law, Is Content-Based But ViewpointNeutral.
The Federal Circuit treated disparagement as distinguishable from the other § 2 bars because it found
disparagement to be not only content-based but also
viewpoint-based. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1335. However,
the line between content- and viewpoint-based regulation is not helpful without a theory of why the particular regulation at issue exists. See, e.g., Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831
(1995) (noting that the distinction between content
and viewpoint discrimination “is not a precise one”);

9
Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 1765 (3d
ed. 1996) (“That it is unconstitutional for the government to act for the purpose of promoting speech favoring the Democrats (as opposed to, say, the Republicans)
does not necessarily entail that it is unconstitutional
for it to act . . . for the purpose of promoting speech favoring democracy (as opposed to, say, totalitarianism).”).
Given the meaning of “disparagement” as a concept that could apply to anyone, the ban on disparaging
marks is more appropriately characterized as contentbased rather than viewpoint-based. Section 2(a) prohibits registration of a mark that disparages anyone,
abortionist or anti-choice zealot. See Ridley v. Mass.
Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 82-87 (1st Cir. 2004)
(considering ban on disparaging subway ads). The Federal Circuit en banc majority claimed that “[t]he legal
significance of viewpoint discrimination is the same
whether the government disapproves of the message
or claims that some part of the populace will disapprove of the message.” In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1336. If
the “part of the populace” at issue were static and unchanging no matter what mark was at issue, that
might be true. However, because the “part of the populace” whose views are considered changes depending
on the specifics of the applied-for mark, no particular
group or set of viewpoints receives protection denied to
everyone else. See id. at 1372 (Dyk, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n,
551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007)) (“[T]he standard is not based
on the government’s disagreement with anything.

10
Rather, it is based on an objective, ‘neutral’ assessment
of a non-government perspective – in this case, a ‘substantial composite of the referenced group.’ . . . [T]here
is no ‘realistic possibility that official suppression of
ideas is afoot.’ ”). Like defamation, which is contentbased but not viewpoint-based, the disparagement bar
protects everyone. In the world of trademark registration, no one is licensed to fight freestyle; we are all “to
follow Marquis of Queensbury rules” in our registered
trademarks. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391
(1992); see also Lisa P. Ramsey, A Free Speech Right to
Trademark Protection?, 106 Trademark Rep. 797, 87677 (2016).
Furthermore, viewpoint discrimination in the past
has been tied to the viewpoint of the person who is losing out because of her speech, such as a speaker denied
school funding because her viewpoint was religious instead of nonreligious. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995). By
contrast, the disparagement exclusion denies registrations equally to people trying to disparage a group and
to people trying to reclaim terms on behalf of the disparaged group, as long as a substantial composite of
the referenced group would see the term as disparaging. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 391 (a
hypothetical statute that prohibited “odious racial epithets . . . to proponents of all views” would not discriminate on basis of viewpoint). Thus, the disparagement
bar is also neutral as to the applicant’s membership in
and viewpoint on the particular disparaged group at
issue. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315-19 (1988)

11
(plurality) (upholding law against display of any sign
within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if the sign would
tend to bring that foreign government into “public
odium” or “disrepute”; restriction was not viewpointbased because looking at policies of foreign governments was neutral method of identifying covered
speech); Ridley, 390 F.3d at 90 (“[G]uidelines prohibiting demeaning or disparaging ads are themselves
viewpoint neutral.”); id. at 91 (“[T]he state is not attempting to give one group an advantage over another
in the marketplace of ideas.”). Cf. Ark. Educ. Television
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (denying
participation in political debate to candidate with minimal public support was not viewpoint-based, because
participation would be denied to anyone who lacked
sufficient support, no matter what views he held). So,
for example, if an applicant applied for CELEBRASIANS for an advocacy group that sought to bar Asian
immigration, the mark would not be disparaging even
if the group’s intention was disparaging.
The In re Tam majority’s error was to find viewpoint discrimination because the bar relies on determining what a group of people understands the
meaning of a term to be, in context. The error of conflating the speaker’s viewpoint with the audience’s understanding, if left undisturbed, would indicate that
the deceptiveness and descriptiveness bars are also
viewpoint-based. See Ned Snow, Free Speech and Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 100, 145 (2016).
Terms that convey materially false meanings about a
good or service are unregistrable (regardless of the

12
presence of an intent to deceive), In re Budge Mfg. Co.,
857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988), but misdescriptive
terms that have secondary meaning are registrable so
long as consumers do not find the misdescription to
be material to their purchasing decision. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f ), while terms that accurately describe the
goods or services with which they are used can only be
registered with secondary meaning. Id. All of these
rules require subjective, observer-based inquiries dependent on what the audience believes and considers
important, just as the perception of the target group
makes the difference for disparagement.
The regulatory nature of trademark registration
is vital here because each individual decision is based
on the specifics of what the applicant is applying for.
Each individual decision may involve a viewpoint, but
the law itself does not judge based on viewpoint. Nor,
again, does it matter what the applicant’s identity or
viewpoint is, as long as the targeted group would find
the mark disparaging. Trademark law simply does not
care about the applicant’s views. See In re Heeb Media,
LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071, 1077 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (holding
that the determination of the meaning of the mark centers on the referenced group’s perception of the term
rather than the applicant’s intentions.)

13
C. Precedents Involving Bans On Speech,
Even Commercial Speech Precedents,
Do Not Make Sense For Trademark Law.
The Federal Circuit’s mistake was to treat a regulatory, rights-granting program as if it were a punishment for speech, rather than a government program
awarding rights to control commercial speech to one
private party: rights that allow the registrant to suppress the speech of others. The different justifications,
functioning, and risks of registration compared to laws
punishing speech make application of precedents involving punishment for speech to the Lanham Act both
incoherent and unwise.
Reed, on which the Federal Circuit relied, evaluated a prohibition on speech. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), another case invoked by the Federal Circuit, likewise
establishes a four-part test to determine if bans on
commercial speech survive First Amendment scrutiny.
The first step in the inquiry asks whether the speech
at issue is false or misleading; if so, it may simply be
banned. Several consequences follow for evaluating
trademark law: first, Central Hudson, like Reed, is not
appropriate for evaluating a discretionary government
act. Second and relatedly, as detailed in Part II.A.,
trademarks as such are neither truthful nor deceptive
without legal recognition of trademark rights, making
traditional Central Hudson analysis difficult at best.
Moreover, trademark law has not limited itself to
speech meeting the definition of “commercial speech”
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used in First Amendment cases. Courts have found infringement in books, Penguin Books USA, Inc. v. Dr.
Seuss Enters., 521 U.S. 1146 (1997), parody magazines,
Balducci Publ’ns v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 513 U.S. 1112
(1995), art, Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int’l,
Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), and songs,
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003)9
– and even when they have not found infringement in
such cases, they have generally not relied on the fact
that the challenged speech is noncommercial to take it
outside the scope of the Lanham Act, instead developing special tests to deal with possible trademark infringement in noncommercial speech. See, e.g., Rogers
v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
Thus, when a trademark registration is issued by the
government, the registrant is better able to suppress
the speech of others – a situation that itself triggers
First Amendment concerns about the scope of the resulting right.10 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). Even if the suppression is only of commercial speech, that too is of constitutional moment under

9
Many members of Amici consider these cases to have the
wrong outcomes, but Amici here emphasize that the Lanham Act
is a broad and multifaceted statute, and a First Amendment ruling on registration should recognize that scope.
10
See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (enjoining the San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. from using the word “Olympic”
in the promotion of the “Gay Olympic Games”); MGM-Pathe
Commc’ns v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(enjoining the use of “Pink Panther Patrol” to a group of gay rights
activists for their anti-violence campaign).
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Central Hudson. (In other words, if the speech suppressed by trademark enforcement is unimportant because it is commercial, then so too is the registrant’s
speech.)
Thus, unlike the classic speech ban against which
most First Amendment doctrine is directed, no matter
what decision the government makes in applying the
bars of § 2, it will inhibit someone’s speech – either the
mark owner’s, or everyone else’s. Registration even
goes beyond whatever rights might have existed at
common law, providing, for example, nationwide rights
in advance of any local use, and protection against
invalidation for lack of secondary meaning after five
years. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c); 15 U.S.C. § 1065. In the issuance and refusal of trademark registrations there is no
such thing as neutrality. The government has decided
to shape the market for speech by regulating trademarks.
II.

DENIAL OF REGISTRATION IS NOT A
PUNISHMENT FOR SPEECH.

Trademark rights are not created through registration; they are acquired through the use of a distinctive mark in commerce.11 Rather than being a penalty
11

Amici do not believe that the constitutionality of the disparagement bar ought to turn on whether § 43(a) protection is
available for an unregistrable mark. At a minimum, the Court
should recognize that registration may be unavailable on many
absolute grounds, such as lack of use by the applicant as a trademark; lack of use by the applicant in U.S. commerce; functionality;
deceptiveness; and genericity, as well as on the relative ground of
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imposed on an actor doing business independently of
the government, denial of registration requires interaction with the government. Absent government action, there can be no registration. Given that baseline,
unconstitutional conditions analysis is the most appropriate doctrine to assess registration.
A. Registration Is Discretionary, And Directed Only At The Trademark Function, Not At Other Meaning.
Although registration is not a traditional monetary subsidy as in many unconstitutional conditions
cases, the subsidy label is simply a way to identify
government acts that do not impose penalties and
thus may be appropriate even if content-based. Unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes that the
government has more freedom to pick and choose beneficiaries where a private entity has no preexisting
right to the benefit.12 Government may not deny benefits based on an entity’s speech outside the boundaries
likely confusion with an existing mark already in use in the U.S.
Whether, or when, one entity should be able to use § 43(a) to prevent another from using an unregistrable symbol involves both
questions of statutory interpretation and of the policies underlying bars on registration, and the Court should not give a casual
answer to that complex question in a case in which the question
is only subsidiary. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819
F.3d 697, 708-09 (2016) pet’n for cert. filed No. 16-548 (Oct. 20,
2016); Renna v. County of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310, at 320.
12
Government speech is strongly related to unconstitutional
conditions – the relevant considerations are similar, but unconstitutional conditions may better encompass the different ways in
which government may carry out its aims.
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of a government-funded program, and it may not discriminate based on viewpoint, but it may pursue goals
that require it to evaluate content.
Under an unconstitutional conditions analysis,
the government’s legitimate options are defined by the
nature of the program. In trademark registration, the
program is to include on the register those marks that
identify source – a specific function of symbols – so long
as they do not run afoul of a statutory bar. Bongrain
Int’l (American) Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc., 811 F.2d
1479, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In 1979, this Court recognized that trademarks have “no intrinsic meaning.”
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). Unlike copyright law, trademark law does not protect symbols as
such. Instead, trademark protects only symbols’ source
designating function, which can only be assessed contextually in relation to particular goods or services to
which they are applied. “Apple” does not intrinsically
designate a computer company; neither does “Microsoft”; “Google” once was the name of a search engine
company but now is only the name of its most popular
service.
Because trademarks do not have intrinsic sourceindicating content, the Lanham Act regulates the symbol only in its role as a source identifier and the other
functions of symbols are not implicated by trademark
law. The primary drafter of the Lanham Act, Edward
Rogers, put it this way:
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[T]he trade mark in and by itself is of little
importance[;] it is but the visible manifestation of a much more important thing, a business good will[;] the good will is the substance,
the trade mark merely the shadow, and . . .
this business good will is the property to be
protected against invasion.
Edward S. Rogers, Comments on the Modern Law of
Unfair Trade, 3 Ill. L. Rev. 551, 555 (1909) (footnote
omitted); see also Beverly W. Pattishall, Trade-Marks
and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 967, 971
(1952) (“[B]asically it is the intangible thing, the individual identity, which must be protected – as may be
necessary – not any individual word or mark, as such,
which is relied upon to achieve that identity.”).
In First Amendment terms, the truth value of
source indication, which is the only meaning that
trademark law regulates, cannot be determined in the
abstract. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 815
(1935) (explaining that trademark value stems from
the willingness of the government to suppress unauthorized uses on the trademark claimant’s behalf ).
Unlike ordinary communication, where changing the
words can change the meaning, Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971), a change of mark does not
change the link between the mark and the trademark
function, which is the only thing trademark law regulates. Google is Alphabet. And it is Alphabet, the legal
entity, even though it continues to be called Google in
everyday parlance.
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The government has no interest in assigning the
ownership of the non-trademark meaning of a symbol.
Whether a term is arbitrary (apple for computers), suggestive (ivory for soap), or fanciful (hobbit for invented
characters), trademark law deliberately leaves the
non-source identification functions of symbols to the
vagaries of public discourse. The non-source identification functions of symbols, of course, affect whether a
term is deceptive, disparaging, descriptive, arbitrary,
etc. for particular goods or services (e.g., apple for
lipstick versus apple for computers). Thus, the nontrademark meaning of a term necessarily becomes part
of the trademark analysis. Nonetheless, trademark
law only provides rights in the source-identification aspect of a symbol. An applicant’s interest, correspondingly, is solely in obtaining those rights, and not in
claiming rights in any non-source-related meaning of
a symbol.
Because the trademark function can be separated
from the other communicative functions of a symbol,
the registration system can operate without having
harmful effects on those other functions.13 The content
of expression is important to figuring out if a symbol is
capable of being a trademark, but denying trademark
rights regulates only the commercial aspects of the
speaker’s message. Denial of registration relates to the
13

This Court has made a related distinction in cases in
which commercial speech is not “inextricably intertwined” with
noncommercial speech, allowing the commercial elements to be
regulated under Central Hudson. See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989).
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source meaning of a symbol, but does nothing to regulate use of the symbol in any other way, even if – indeed, especially if – the bar applies to symbols with
particular non-source-related meaning. If the trademark owner wants to communicate other things about
itself (including “we wish to reclaim a slur”), it can use
other symbols in conjunction with its mark.
B. The Disparagement Bar Does Not Impose An Unconstitutional Condition.
Denying rights to register based on a symbol’s
non-trademark meaning is necessarily at the core of
many registration refusals, but not because of any discrimination against viewpoints or “penalty” for speech.
Denial of registration occurs because Congress has determined that certain non-trademark meanings make
symbols inappropriate for registration as a trademark,
whether that’s because of deception, interference with
competition, or interference with the interests of others engaged in commerce (an interest common to the
bans on registration of personal names without consent and on disparagement). As long as everyone is allowed to use a term in non-trademark ways, trademark
law is not regulating or suppressing either the registrant or nonregistrants’ uses in anything other than
the trademark sense.
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1. The Government Is Not Leveraging
Refusal Of Registration For Speech
Outside The Registration Program;
Applicants Remain Free To Use Any
Symbols They Wish.
Unconstitutional conditions doctrine regularly
struggles to determine what counts as coercion, or as
the appropriate baseline from which to measure an
entitlement. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1420 (1989)
(“[D]eciding under what circumstances government offers, like private offers, are coercive is an inevitably
normative inquiry.”). The Federal Circuit chose the
wrong baseline when it declared § 2(a) to impose an
unconstitutional condition, In re Tam, 808 F.3d at
1339-41, because trademark registration is in its entirety about regulating speech: who gets to register
which communicative symbols. The baseline against
which to measure § 2(a) therefore cannot be whether
the government interferes with a speaker’s communication.
Under § 2(a), any speaker can continue to use any
symbol it wants for communicating anything it wants,
but it can only get a registration for matter that does
not run afoul of a statutory exclusion. This distinction
– which allows the government to regulate the mark’s
registration, but not to exercise any leverage over the
speaker’s other speech – is consistent with the leading
unconstitutional conditions cases. In Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court explained that unconstitutional conditions generally involve “situations in
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which the Government has placed a condition on the
recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside
the scope of the federally funded program.” Id. at 197.
This Court more recently repeated its distinction between conditions that specify what activities Congress
wants to subsidize (legitimate) and those that seek to
leverage the subsidy to affect speech outside the government program (illegitimate). Agency for Int’l Dev. v.
All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328
(2013); see also Ramsey, supra, at 858-59.
The Tam en banc majority noted that, in many
cases, an applicant whose application is denied will
choose a new trademark. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1341.
This consequence should not affect the constitutional
analysis for two reasons: First, choosing a new mark
does not mean that the applicant will cease using the
registration-barred symbol as a symbol if it has an
expressive reason for continuing to do so. While the
In re Tam majority claimed that trademark owners
could not “realistically have two brand names, one inoffensive, non-disparaging one (which would be able to
secure registration) and a second, expressive, disparaging one (which would be unregistrable and unprotectable),” 808 F.3d at 1351, that dual system of official
and unofficial names is in fact common in the real
world. We speak of the famous judge Learned Hand, but
his friends knew him as Bunny; Stefani Germanotta
has not changed her legal name, but is generally
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known by her stage name, Lady Gaga. Ronald Reagan
National Airport is still known to locals as National.
Many national sports teams are easily recognizable
by their unofficial nicknames. See, e.g., https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_baseball_team_nicknames.
Many brands also make unprotectable generic terms
large parts of their branding because they desire the
communicative benefits of those terms even absent
registrability: Subway’s FOOTLONG is a highly visible example. Sheetz v. Doctor’s Ass., Inc., 108 U.S.P.Q.2d
1341 (T.T.A.B. 2013). Slogans can be protected separately from names. Relatedly, trade dress and logos can
provide valid, protectable marks if a name is unregistrable. For instance, in the case of the Washington football team, were it to ultimately have its REDSKINS
registrations cancelled, it could continue to protect its
goods and services through its other many registrations such as its stylized R mark and its logo marks.14
Thus, the sandwich shop and the football team both illustrate how a markholder can use other, registrable
marks to receive the full range of government benefits.
Second, chilling effects or disincentives are a common effect of a failure to subsidize or supply a benefit,
but are not constitutionally problematic so long as they
are not designed to limit speech outside the subsidized
program. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197
(1991) (upholding government’s choice to subsidize
14

R Registration. No. 3,090,334 (stylized R logo for merchandise); Registration No. 2,902,746 (Indian head logo trademark for
merchandise); Registration No. 1,861,766 (Indian head logo on a
football helmet for merchandise).
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childbirth, but not abortion); Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 553 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasizing charitable
organizations’ ability to lobby through affiliate organizations as a reason for upholding a tax exemption
conditioned on avoidance of lobbying); Machete Productions, L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 289-90 (5th Cir.
2015) (denial of film subsidy allegedly based on viewpoint did not impose unconstitutional condition where
filmmaker was not prevented from making the film exactly as planned, only without a subsidy); Stephen R.
Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena:
Banning the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral
Trademarks, 83 Trademark Rep. 661, 695 (1993).
Denying Mr. Tam rights in any mark as long as his
band kept the name THE SLANTS would be an unconstitutional penalty for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Denying him the right to register any
mark he wants is not. To analogize to Walker v. Texas
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239
(2015), the speaker is free to put a Confederate flag
bumper sticker on his bumper. He just cannot have it
on the license plate. See also Agency for Int’l Dev., 133
S. Ct. at 2329-30 (discussing ease of working around
restriction as a reason to accept content-based nature
of government program); Regan, 461 U.S. at 548-49
(upholding the subsidy of certain organizations for lobbying and noting the relatively simple work-around for
unsubsidized organizations to get similar treatment).
Under § 2(a), likewise, the band members can keep the
name, use it as they like, and receive the benefits of
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registration by relying on a non-disparaging logo or
other symbol. They just cannot get the government’s
help by invoking only this particular disparaging symbol. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1381 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
The government is not gaining any leverage over the
message appearing outside the registered matter, any
more than it has leverage over the message appearing
on a bumper sticker because it has the power to approve or disapprove license plates. The government’s
unwillingness to take part in the disparaging or racist
aspects of the message communicated by the mark can
therefore itself be a sufficient interest to justify the bar.
Cf. In re Tam, at 1379 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (noting
the Lanham Act’s goal, under the Commerce Clause, of
assisting the free flow of commerce open to all).
The broader point is that, ultimately, the government must weigh in on the validity of a speaker’s
choice of marks if the mark is to be enforced against
others. That is, because the entire system of trademark
registration is a system of speech regulation, it is very
different from the unconstitutional conditions cases
finding that the government overstepped its bounds.
Because the government is heavily involved in defining and enforcing trademark rights, its hands-off position to avoid the possibility that the government would
be seen as validating disparagement should be held to
be constitutional.
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2. Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis
Is Appropriate Because Central Hudson Scrutiny Cannot Properly Assess
A Comprehensive Government Program That Requires Evaluation Of
Speech To Function.
Assuming arguendo that trademark law only regulates commercial speech, the alternative to unconstitutional conditions is Central Hudson analysis (or
strict scrutiny). But such scrutiny could not be limited
to the disparagement bar. Many of the other bars, as
well as other provisions of the Lanham Act, have features that are at least dubious under Central Hudson
scrutiny, which assumes that the government is directly suppressing speech and therefore puts a relatively heavy burden on the government to justify its
prohibitions. False or misleading commercial speech
can simply be banned. Thus marks that create a false
association under § 2(a), and marks that are deceptive
or misdescriptive under § 2(a) or § 2(e)(3) are likely not
protected speech (assuming that they are commercial
speech). However, substantial issues of tailoring and
evidence would remain. Because barring registration
of deceptive marks is possible, then all the subject matter-specific, deception-adjacent bans would seem to fail
the less restrictive means test. The less restrictive
means already present in the statute is to make an individualized determination of deceptiveness rather
than to deter all uses of marks within a class, even if
that class runs a higher than average risk of being
deceptive.
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Likewise, the USPTO’s use of inference and common sense, without considering the actual marketplace context of a mark’s use that might eliminate
deception in practice, may make deceptiveness refusals overinclusive. Moreover, as it stands, the USPTO
can refuse registration even when the applicant shows
that matter outside the applied-for mark makes actual
deception unlikely, e.g., In re Volk Art, Inc., No. 74/693,416,
1998 WL 377661, at *4 (T.T.A.B. July 8, 1998), or when
a term has a non-deceptive meaning that can be clarified by the rest of a product’s packaging, e.g., In re
Wadhwa, No. 86023037, 2016 WL 1045678, at *2-6
(T.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2016). If, as courts are beginning to
suggest, prophylactic anti-confusion rules are not narrowly tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny, then
trademark law’s unwillingness to consider disclaimers
outside the applied-for matter seems constitutionally
suspect. See Pursuing America’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.3d 500, 507-11 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Separately, refusing registration does not stop the
use of a symbol to deceive consumers, meaning that the
harm inflicted on the applicant from denying the registration does not necessarily further the government’s
interest. Indeed, if the government’s refusal is correct,
then by hypothesis the applicant’s use of a deceptive
term is material to consumers, thus helping to sell the
product. Even absent a registration, the applicant
would therefore have every incentive to continue using
the deceptive term. While an outright ban on the use
of a deceptive term under false advertising law would
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be appropriately tailored to the government’s interest,
refusing registration would not be.
The bar on registering marks confusingly similar
to marks already registered or in use also seems, at
first look, highly connected to deception. See In re Tam,
808 F.3d at 1329 (stating that such bars were constitutionally unproblematic). However, the standard under
which the USPTO refuses registration does not take
real likelihood of confusion into account, because it deliberately abstracts away from marketplace context,
refusing to consider additional distinguishing features
that in practice always appear next to a supposedly
confusing mark. For example, if Tam’s mark THE
SLANTS is ultimately registered, an application to
register THE SLANTS would be refused for a second
band even if in reality the second band always accompanied the term with a clear distinguishing feature,
such as “the really racist ones.” Confusion for registration purposes will often be measured differently than
confusion in the actual marketplace. B&B Hardware,
Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1308 (2015).
The registration inquiry abstracts away from marketplace context in order to make the registration system
work by providing a searchable, understandable list of
the terms that are off-limits to other businesses. Having two separate registrations of THE SLANTS for
identical services would be inconsistent with that systemic objective. However, administrative convenience
is generally not a sufficient justification for limiting
First Amendment rights – when the limit involves a
ban on speech rather than a government-conferred
benefit.
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Other sensible registration bars, even the bar on
registering merely descriptive marks, would also be extremely vulnerable under Central Hudson or strict
scrutiny taken seriously. See Rebecca Tushnet, The
First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and Free Speech, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 22-23) (available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2745016);
see also Snow, supra, at 125-30 (discussing other trademark issues, such as priority and infringement, that
would also face invalidity). For instance, under § 2(c),
a flag is not registrable when it forms part of a mark
even where there is no suggestion of affiliation with
the government that flag represents. Such exclusions
from registration do not rest on any judgment that the
mark is deceptive or likely to cause consumer confusion, nor do they protect the markholder’s investment
in his mark.
The widespread chaos that the decision below
would cause in registration, and trademark law more
generally, if applied according to its own terms, demonstrates that it is inappropriate to use a test about suppressing speech to evaluate whether the government
can refuse to give a registration, or even a private right
of action, to a commercial speaker.
3. Analogies To Copyright Are Flawed.
In striking down the § 2(a) disparagement bar, the
Federal Circuit analogized to copyright law. In re Tam,
808 F.3d at 1346-48. Unlike trademark law, however,
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copyright protects the expression in a work. Therefore,
in copyright, to mandate that a work of authorship
be non-disparaging or non-obscene to get protection
would be to target the content of the work itself as a
condition of the benefits of protection.15 See Ramsey,
supra, at 879-81 (elaborating relevant distinctions between the regimes). Trademark law is different because it protects only the source identification function
of a symbol and not the symbol itself. Thus, any business can continue to use the symbol for which the
government refuses registration, even for the very
products and services for which it sought registration,
and still have its trade interests protected, if it also
chooses some other symbol to make the link between
itself and its goods and services.16 Mr. Tam’s speech is
unaffected, and the government’s interest in avoiding

15
Because copyright protects only expression, and not ideas,
barring protection for disparaging works might well impose an
unconstitutional condition insofar as it reached outside the government-provided benefit for expression to penalize the speaker’s
ideas. In addition, just as with trademark, denying copyright protection on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint would be unconstitutional.
16
The trademark function also distinguishes registration
from New York’s unconstitutional “Son of Sam” law, which allowed
the state to escrow money received from a criminal’s expression
about his crimes. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108 (1991). Even assuming
there is a constitutional right to profit from one’s expression,
Tam’s band can perform under the name Slants without financial
sanction, and with trademark protection for other symbols, and
the government will not escrow the resulting income nor tax the
sales any differently than it does for other sales.
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any appearance of endorsement of discrimination in
commerce is also satisfied.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit failed to appreciate
that the government could indeed withdraw or refuse
to grant copyright protection to categories of works
(as it has done) without violating the First Amendment. Architectural works, for example, were excluded
from copyright protection for two centuries with no
First Amendment problems; sound recordings were excluded for decades; perfume, yoga, gardens, and other
forms of creative works are still excluded. These examples demonstrate that current copyrightability rules
are indeed content-based. See, e.g., Kelley v. Chi.
Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices (Third)
(2014) §§ 313.6(c), 806.5(B)(3) (including, among other
things, functional physical movements (like yoga), social dances, bridges, interior design, and landscape
design as noncopyrightable subject matter) http://www.
copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf; Christopher
Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law,
97 Cornell L. Rev. 501, 540-41 (2012). The relevant
question is whether the exclusions are sufficiently related to a legitimate purpose for the government’s program, and this legitimate purpose may come from the
categories of creative activity the government wishes
to encourage.
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III. VAGUENESS IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT
REASON TO INVALIDATE THE DISPARAGEMENT BAR.
As with many other trademark determinations,
the application of § 2 results in inevitable errors and
inconsistencies. For example, WHITE PRIDE COUNTRY WIDE17 was refused registration as disparaging
while ASIAN PRIDE and BLACK PRIDE18 were registered. There are, however, several reasons not to
conclude that these inconsistencies indicate a vague
standard. First, inconsistencies naturally result from
contextualization. The examiner assembles evidence of
what a particular term means in the context of the applied-for goods or services, and the evidence of the
meaning of a term to a substantial composite of the
referenced group may differ even for related terms.
Context changes our understanding of words; inoffensive words become offensive and vice versa based
on context. Farley, Stabilizing Morality in Trademark
Law, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1039 (“[C]ontextualization
leads to inconsistent results by design; it is inherent in
the exercise.”).
Second, the USPTO treats every application on its
own merits – for all issues, not just when they raise
§ 2(a) disparagement concerns. See, e.g., In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In
re Couriaire Express Int’l, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. 365, 366
17

WHITE PRIDE COUNTRY WIDE, Serial No. 78368298.
ASIAN PRIDE, Registration No. 2,089,064; BLACK PRIDE,
Registration No. 1,573,602.
18
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(T.T.A.B. 1984) (“That each case must be determined
on its own facts is a proposition so well established
that no authority need be cited in support of it.”).
Third, since the applicant is responsible for presenting
evidence, similar terms may be evaluated with different evidentiary records leading to different results.
See, e.g., McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 240 Fed. App’x 865, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (recounting the initial refusal and subsequent successful
registration after applicant submitted evidence that
lesbians would not perceive the mark as disparaging).
Finally, touted examples of apparent inconsistency are selected from the millions of applications
submitted to the USPTO. The registration system requires hundreds of examiners and attracts hundreds
of thousands of applications per year. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability
Report Fiscal Year 2015, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/USPTOFY15PAR.pdf at 198 tbl.
16 (showing over 300,000 applications filed and approved for publication in Fiscal Year 2015). This scope
should influence the standards by which the system is
judged. As long as the USPTO applies the correct legal
standard, apparent differences in the outcome of similar applications do not represent a fatal constitutional
flaw. Asking the hundreds of examiners (at any given
time) for more than rough consistency in results would
be like asking America’s public school teachers to make
their content-based assessments of English papers
with enough precision that they would all give the
same grades to the same papers.
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The inevitable inconsistency between some selected cases in a merits-based system is, indeed, one
reason why the Court has granted government flexibility in making content-based decisions in analogous situations. Many government grant programs could not
survive if required to be strictly consistent in every
case, and the benefits of having trademark registration
(or public school teachers) are great enough to justify
the inevitable inconsistencies. This is what it means to
have a regulatory state. If the government is going to
maintain a trademark system granting the benefits of
registration after substantive examination, it needs
flexibility and tolerance that is inconsistent with traditional strict scrutiny or even heightened Central
Hudson-style scrutiny.19
The risks of First Amendment scrutiny should be
particularly apparent with respect to the argument
that disparagement is unconstitutionally vague. If
vagueness is a constitutional flaw in disparagement,
then the list of potential vagueness challenges will be
long. Indeed, similar inconsistency plagues most of the
other bars; distinctions between inherently distinctive,
19

Cf. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
585 (1998) (“Any content-based considerations that may be taken
into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the
nature of arts funding. The NEA has limited resources, and it
must deny the majority of the grant applications that it receives,
including many that propose ‘artistically excellent’ projects.”).
The PTO’s resources are not limited in the same way as those of
the National Endowment for the Arts, but the “nature” of its endeavor equally requires multiple content-based determinations
assessing the meaning of a specific mark in its specific context.
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immediately registrable marks, descriptive marks that
can only be registered upon a showing of secondary
meaning, and generic terms that can never be protected as marks; the “use as a mark” precedents requiring trademark use instead of ornamental use for
registration; and the infringement standards themselves.
There is, for example, a circuit split on the question of whether CHICKEN OF THE SEA is inherently
distinctive or descriptive when used for tuna. Compare
Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Packman Bros., 79 F.2d 511,
511-12 (3d Cir. 1935) (per curiam) (descriptive), with
Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Alexander B. Stewart Orgs.,
50 F.2d 976, 979 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (suggestive). Many
cases note the difficulty of marking the line between
suggestive, descriptive, and generic terms. See, e.g.,
Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d
Cir. 1985) (“It cannot be gainsaid that the judiciary is
ill-equipped to distinguish between the descriptively
suggestive and the suggestively descriptive mark. In
addition, societal vicissitudes demand that the categories retain fluidity to accommodate a particular mark’s
evolving usage over time. . . . [I]t is necessary to surmise the mental processes of those in the marketplace
at whom the mark is directed.” (footnote omitted));
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th
Cir. 1979) (“The line separating [suggestive and descriptive marks] is uncertain; extrapolating the line
from precedent would be impossible. . . . [T]he distinction between descriptive and suggestive marks may be
inarticulable. . . .”); Thompson Med. Co., 753 F.2d at
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213 n.8 (“[B]ecause generic marks cannot be protected
even upon a showing of secondary meaning, courts increasingly have been called upon to delineate the chimerical line between the descriptive and the generic.”).
Examples could be multiplied indefinitely. See Snow,
supra, at 156-58 (noting that other bars are also vague
and uncertain); Tushnet, supra, at 33-35; cf. 2 Thomas
J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition §§ 11:24, 11:72 (4th ed. 2016) (listing examples of marks found suggestive and merely descriptive).
While most of the hundreds of thousands of trademark registration determinations made every year are
never challenged outside of the USPTO, they do involve content-based evaluations of specific symbols.
Given the size of the system and its need to balance
rights among different applicants, competitors, and the
general public, general principles of administrative
law, not the rules of strict scrutiny, are more appropriate for assessing the performance of the system.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
The decision below – that all content-based trademark rules must survive strict scrutiny – would wreak
havoc on trademark law. The Federal Circuit’s treatment of the Lanham Act’s regulatory scheme as presumptively unconstitutional is misguided because it
wrongly treats trademark registration refusal as a
ban on speech. Trademark law is pervasively contentbased, but that is not a fatal flaw for a government
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program. Because § 2 disparagement is a concept that
could apply to anyone, the ban on disparaging marks
is more appropriately characterized as content-based
rather than viewpoint-based. Under the appropriate
analytic framework, the bars of § 2 reflect acceptable
judgments about which symbols should receive legal
protection as source identifiers, not penalties imposed
on an actor doing business independently of the government. The Court should reverse the decision below.
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